Goal-oriented agents in a market

Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and Nicolas Querou

CEE-M Working Papers from CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro

Abstract: We consider a market where \standard" risk-neutral agents coexist with "goalorented" agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payo (the \trigger") to ful ll a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goaloriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments..

Keywords: Goal-oriented agents; incentives; matching market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-des
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02901398v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02901398v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Goal-oriented agents in a market (2021)
Working Paper: Goal-oriented agents in a market (2021)
Working Paper: Goal-Oriented Agents in a Market (2020)
Working Paper: Goal-oriented agents in a market (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpceem:hal-02901398

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEE-M Working Papers from CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laurent Garnier ().