The effect of search frictions on wages
Gerard van den Berg and
Aico van Vuuren
Labour Economics, 2010, vol. 17, issue 6, 875-885
Abstract:
We aim to test whether the degree of informational search frictions in the labor market has a negative effect on wages. In a range of equilibrium search models of the labor market, this effect is predicted to be negative. Nevertheless, this has never been tested. We perform tests with matched worker-firm data. The worker data are informative on individual wages and labor market transitions, and this allows for estimation of the degree of search frictions. The firm data are informative on labor productivity. This allows us to investigate how the mean difference between labor productivity and wages in a market depends on the degree of frictions and other determinants, and to assess the quantitative relevance of frictions for wages.
Keywords: Labor; market; imperfections; Job; durations; Productivity; Heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Effect of Search Frictions on Wages (2003) 
Working Paper: The effect of Search Frictions on Wages (2003) 
Working Paper: The effect of search frictions on wages (2003) 
Working Paper: The Effect of Search Frictions on Wages (2003) 
Working Paper: The Effect of Search Frictions on Wages (2002) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:17:y:2010:i:6:p:875-885
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