Curbing cream-skimming: Evidence on enrolment incentives
Pascal Courty (),
Do Han Kim and
Gerald Marschke ()
Labour Economics, 2011, vol. 18, issue 5, 643-655
Using data from a large, U.S. federal job training program, we investigate whether enrolment incentives that exogenously vary the 'shadow prices' for serving different demographic subgroups of clients influence case workers' intake decisions. We show that case workers enroll more clients from subgroups whose shadow prices increase but select at the margin weaker-performing members from those subgroups. We conclude that enrolment incentives curb cream-skimming across subgroups leaving a residual potential for cream-skimming within a subgroup.
Keywords: Performance; measurement; Performance; standard; Cream-skimming; Enrolment; incentives; Bureaucrat; behavior; Public; organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Curbing Cream-Skimming: Evidence on Enrolment Incentives (2009)
Working Paper: Curbing cream-skimming: Evidence on enrolment incentives (2009)
Working Paper: Curbing Cream-Skimming: Evidence on Enrolment Incentives (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:18:y:2011:i:5:p:643-655
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