Good signals gone bad: Dynamic signalling with switched effort levels
Sander Heinsalu ()
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017, vol. 73, issue C, 132-141
This paper examines signalling when the sender exerts effort and receives benefits over time. Receivers only observe a noisy public signal about the effort, which has no intrinsic value.
Keywords: Dynamic games; Signalling; Incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:73:y:2017:i:c:p:132-141
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