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Social integration in two-sided matching markets

Josue Ortega ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, vol. 78, issue C, 119-126

Abstract: When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration monotonicity, which requires that every agent becomes better off after any number of matching markets merge. Integration monotonicity is also incompatible with the weaker efficiency property of Pareto optimality.

Keywords: Social integration; Integration monotonicity; Matching schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:78:y:2018:i:c:p:119-126