Social Integration in Two-Sided Matching Markets

Josue Ortega

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration monotonicity, which requires that every agent becomes better off after any number of matching markets merge. Integration monotonicity is also incompatible with the weaker efficiency property of Pareto optimality. Nevertheless, I obtain two possibility results. First, stable matching mechanisms never hurt more than one-half of the society after the integration of several matching markets occurs. Second, in random matching markets there are positive expected gains from integration for both sides of the market, which I quantify.

Date: 2017-05, Revised 2018-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 78 (2002) 119-126

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Journal Article: Social integration in two-sided matching markets (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1705.08033

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