Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: A proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem

Agustín Bonifacio

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2024, vol. 130, issue C, 1-3

Abstract: By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem.

Keywords: Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem; Manipulability; Dictatorial power; Tops-only rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000428
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Trade-off between Manipulability and Dictatorial Power: a Proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem (2023)
Working Paper: Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:130:y:2024:i:c:p:1-3

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.04.003

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().