Trade-off between Manipulability and Dictatorial Power: a Proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem

Agustín Bonifacio

No 254, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of the Gibbard– Satterthwaite Theorem.

Keywords: Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem; manipulability; dictatorial power; tops-only rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2023-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/254.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: A proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem (2024)
Working Paper: Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:254

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laura Inés D Amato (laura.damato@gmail.com).