Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

Agustín Bonifacio

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.

Date: 2023-06, Revised 2023-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2306.04587 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: A proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem (2024)
Working Paper: Trade-off between Manipulability and Dictatorial Power: a Proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem (2023)
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