The exact lower bound for the Coleman index of the power of a collectivity for a special class of simple majority games

Sonali Roy ()

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, vol. 56, issue 2, 296-300

Abstract: Coleman [Coleman, J.S., 1971. Control of collectivities and the power of a collectivity to act. In: Leberman, B. (Ed.), Social Choice. Gordon and Breach, New York] proposed a measure of the power that a decision-making body has to pass any bill that comes before it. He termed it "the power of a collectivity to act". In this paper we provide some numerical bounds on the values that this measure can take when the collectivity takes decisions under simple majority voting rule.

Keywords: Voting; power; index; Weighted; majority; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4896(08)00052-8
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: The Exact Lower Bound for the Coleman Index of the Power of a Collectivity for a Special Class of Simple Majority Games (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:2:p:296-300

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().