The Exact Lower Bound for the Coleman Index of the Power of a Collectivity for a Special Class of Simple Majority Games

Sonali Roy ()

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Coleman [Coleman, J.S., 1971. Control of collectivities and the power of a collectivity to act. In: Leberman, B. (Ed.), Social Choice. Gordon and Breach, New York] proposed a measure of the power that a decision-making body has to pass any bill that comes before it. He termed it ﾓthe power of a collectivity to actﾔ. In this paper we provide some numerical bounds on the values that this measure can take when the collectivity takes decisions under simple majority voting rule.

Date: 2008-07-25
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Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, September 2008, vol. 56 no. 2, pp. 296-300

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