Details about Sonali Roy
Access statistics for papers by Sonali Roy.
Last updated 2020-08-14. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pro1090
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Working Papers
2013
- Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games and minimal winning coalitions
Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics
Also in Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics (2011) Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics (2013) Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics (2013)
2012
- Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games
Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics View citations (3)
Also in Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics (2009) 
See also Journal Article Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2012) View citations (3) (2012)
2009
- A Note on the Carreras-Coleman Decisiveness Index
Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics
See also Journal Article A NOTE ON THE CARRERAS-COLEMAN DECISIVENESS INDEX, International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. (2009) (2009)
- On the Structure of Minimal Winning Coalitions in Simple Voting Games
Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics
See also Journal Article On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2010) View citations (1) (2010)
2008
- The Exact Lower Bound for the Coleman Index of the Power of a Collectivity for a Special Class of Simple Majority Games
Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics
See also Journal Article The exact lower bound for the Coleman index of the power of a collectivity for a special class of simple majority games, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (2008) (2008)
2007
- A Characterization and Some Properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley Sensitivity Index
Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics
See also Journal Article A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2004) View citations (4) (2004)
- A New Characterization of the Banzhaf Index of Power
Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics
See also Journal Article A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BANZHAF INDEX OF POWER, International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. (2005) View citations (3) (2005)
- A Treatment of Absolute Indices of Polarization
Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics View citations (18)
See also Journal Article A TREATMENT OF ABSOLUTE INDICES OF POLARIZATION*, The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association (2007) View citations (21) (2007)
- Measuring Power in Weighted Majority Games
Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics View citations (2)
- On the Coleman Indices of Voting Power
Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics
See also Journal Article On the Coleman indices of voting power, European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier (2006) View citations (2) (2006)
Journal Articles
2012
- Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games
Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, 38, (1), 11-22 View citations (3)
See also Working Paper Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games, Staff General Research Papers Archive (2012) View citations (3) (2012)
2010
- On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games
Social Choice and Welfare, 2010, 34, (3), 429-440 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper On the Structure of Minimal Winning Coalitions in Simple Voting Games, Staff General Research Papers Archive (2009) (2009)
2009
- A NOTE ON THE CARRERAS-COLEMAN DECISIVENESS INDEX
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, 11, (02), 237-245 
See also Working Paper A Note on the Carreras-Coleman Decisiveness Index, Staff General Research Papers Archive (2009) (2009)
2008
- The exact lower bound for the Coleman index of the power of a collectivity for a special class of simple majority games
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, 56, (2), 296-300 
See also Working Paper The Exact Lower Bound for the Coleman Index of the Power of a Collectivity for a Special Class of Simple Majority Games, Staff General Research Papers Archive (2008) (2008)
2007
- A TREATMENT OF ABSOLUTE INDICES OF POLARIZATION*
The Japanese Economic Review, 2007, 58, (2), 273-293 View citations (21)
See also Working Paper A Treatment of Absolute Indices of Polarization, Staff General Research Papers Archive (2007) View citations (18) (2007)
2006
- On the Coleman indices of voting power
European Journal of Operational Research, 2006, 171, (1), 273-289 View citations (2)
See also Working Paper On the Coleman Indices of Voting Power, Staff General Research Papers Archive (2007) (2007)
2005
- A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BANZHAF INDEX OF POWER
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2005, 07, (04), 545-553 View citations (3)
See also Working Paper A New Characterization of the Banzhaf Index of Power, Staff General Research Papers Archive (2007) (2007)
2004
- A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index
Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 49, (1), 31-48 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper A Characterization and Some Properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley Sensitivity Index, Staff General Research Papers Archive (2007) (2007)
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