On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games

Maria Axenovich () and Sonali Roy ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2010, vol. 34, issue 3, 429-440

Date: 2010
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Working Paper: On the Structure of Minimal Winning Coalitions in Simple Voting Games (2009)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-009-0408-2

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