Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide

Marcelo Caffera, Juan Dubra () and Nicolás Figueroa

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 91, issue C, 56-61

Abstract: It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium).

Date: 2018
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Related works:
Working Paper: Mechanism Design when players´ preferences and information coincide (2016)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:91:y:2018:i:c:p:56-61

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.08.002

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