Mechanism Design when players´ preferences and information coincide

Marcelo Caffera, Juan Dubra () and Nicolás Figueroa

No 1603, Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers from Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo.

Abstract: It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium).

Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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https://www2.um.edu.uy/fcee_papers/2016/Mechanism_ ... rmation_coincide.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide (2018)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnt:wpaper:1603

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