Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide

Juan Dubra (), Marcelo Caffera and Nicolás Figueroa

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium).

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Mechanism Design; Truth Telling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75721/1/MPRA_paper_75721.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide (2018)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design when players´ preferences and information coincide (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:75721

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