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Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

Peter Bearse, Buly Cardak (), Gerhard Glomm and B Ravikumar

European Journal of Political Economy, 2013, vol. 32, issue C, 26-37

Abstract: We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribution of welfare gains and losses across households by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not sufficiently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result is robust to partial voter turnout and efficiency differences between public and private schools, but depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system.

Keywords: Education vouchers; Majority voting; Calibration; Welfare gains; Partial voter turnout (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I22 D72 H52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box? (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box? (2011) Downloads
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