Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

Peter Bearse, Buly Cardak, Gerhard Glomm () and B Ravikumar

No 2011-032, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribution of welfare gains and losses across house- holds by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not sufficiently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system.

Keywords: Education; Households (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://s3.amazonaws.com/real.stlouisfed.org/wp/2011/2011-032.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box? (2013)
Working Paper: Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box? (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2011-032

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

DOI: 10.20955/wp.2011.032

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Scott St. Louis ().