Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?
Buly Cardak (),
Gerhard Glomm () and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribtuion of welfare gains and losses across households by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not su¢ ciently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system.
Keywords: vouchers; political economy; opting out; education finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H40 D70 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08, Revised 2011-09
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Journal Article: Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box? (2013)
Working Paper: Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box? (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:34131
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