A market for connections

Topi Miettinen and Panu Poutvaara

European Journal of Political Economy, 2014, vol. 33, issue C, 37-52

Abstract: Government or company decisions on whom to hire or whom to give a contract are mostly delegated to politicians, public sector officials or human resource and procurement managers. Due to anti-corruption laws, agents cannot sell contracts that they are delegated to decide upon. Even if bribing is ruled out, those interested in the spoils may invest in a good relationship with the deciding agents in order to be remembered when the decision is made. In this paper, we analyze such markets for connections in the presence of convex costs of networking.

Keywords: Procurement; Nominations; Rent-seeking; Networks; Politicians (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D85 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: A market for connections (2014)
Working Paper: A Market for Connections (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:33:y:2014:i:c:p:37-52

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.11.003

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