A Market for Connections

Topi Miettinen and Panu Poutvaara

No 3810, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Government or company decisions on whom to hire are mostly delegated to politicians, public sector officials or human resources and procurement managers. Due to anti-corruption laws, agents cannot sell contracts or positions that they are delegated to decide upon. Even if bribing is ruled out, those interested in the spoils may invest in a good relationship with the deciding agents in order to be remembered when the nomination is made. In this paper, we analyze such markets for connections in the presence of convex costs of networking.

Keywords: nominations; rent-seeking; networks; politicians; procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D52 D72 D85 H57 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Related works:
Journal Article: A market for connections (2014)
Working Paper: A market for connections (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3810

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