A Market for Connections
Topi Miettinen () and
Panu Poutvaara ()
No 3810, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Government or company decisions on whom to hire are mostly delegated to politicians, public sector officials or human resources and procurement managers. Due to anti-corruption laws, agents cannot sell contracts or positions that they are delegated to decide upon. Even if bribing is ruled out, those interested in the spoils may invest in a good relationship with the deciding agents in order to be remembered when the nomination is made. In this paper, we analyze such markets for connections in the presence of convex costs of networking.
Keywords: nominations; rent-seeking; networks; politicians; procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D52 D72 D85 H57 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: A market for connections (2014)
Working Paper: A market for connections (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3810
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