Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

Klaus Abbink, Utteeyo Dasgupta, Lata Gangadharan () and Tarun Jain

Journal of Public Economics, 2014, vol. 111, issue C, 17-28

Abstract: This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.

Keywords: Harassment bribes; Experiment; Asymmetric penalty; Retaliation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (83)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes (2013)
Working Paper: Letting the briber go free: an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:111:y:2014:i:c:p:17-28

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012

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