Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes

Klaus Abbink, Utteeyo Dasgupta, Lata Gangadharan () and Tarun Jain

No 62-13, Monash Economics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribetakers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.

Keywords: Harassment bribes; Experiment; Asymmetric Penalty; Retaliation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2013-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes (2014)
Working Paper: Letting the briber go free: an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes (2012)
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