Letting the briber go free: an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

Klaus Abbink, Utteeyo Dasgupta, Lata Gangadharan () and Tarun Jain

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Basu (2011) advocates legal immunity for bribe-givers, while retaining culpability for bribe-takers. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the positive disciplining effect of such an implementation. As a result, asymmetric liability on its own may face challenges in the field.

Keywords: harassment bribes; experiment; asymmetric penalty; retaliation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42176/1/MPRA_paper_42176.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes (2014)
Working Paper: Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:42176

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().