Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment

Laurent Bouton, Micael Castanheira and Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Journal of Public Economics, 2016, vol. 134, issue C, 114-128

Abstract: We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) with those of plurality. This comparison is motivated by the theoretical prediction that, in our aggregate uncertainty setup, AV should produce close to first-best outcomes, while plurality will not. The experiment shows, first, that welfare gains are substantial. Second, both aggregate and individual responses are in line with theoretical predictions, and thus with strategic voting. Finally, subjects' behavior under AV highlights the need to study equilibria in asymmetric strategies.

Keywords: Multicandidate elections; Information aggregation; Plurality; Approval voting; Laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment (2015)
Working Paper: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment (2012)
Working Paper: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:134:y:2016:i:c:p:114-128

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.11.003

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