Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment

Laurent Bouton, Micael Castanheira and Aniol Llorente-Saguer

No 777, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Abstract: We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) with those of plurality. This comparison is motivated by the theoretical predictions that, in our aggregate uncertainty setup, AV should produce close to first-best outcomes, while plurality will not. The experiment shows, first, that welfare gains are substantial. Second, both aggregate and individual responses are in line with theoretical predictions, and thus with strategic voting. Finally, subjects' behaviour under AV highlights the need to study equilibria in asymmetric strategies.

Keywords: Multicandidate elections; Information aggregation; Plurality; Approval Voting; Laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12-20
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Related works:
Journal Article: Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment (2016)
Working Paper: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment (2012)
Working Paper: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment (2012)
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