Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment

Micael Castanheira, Laurent Bouton and Aniol Llorente-Saguer

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) with thoseof plurality. This comparison is motivated by the theoretical prediction that, in our aggregate uncertainty setup,AV should produce close to first-best outcomes,while pluralitywill not. The experiment shows, first, thatwelfaregains are substantial. Second, both aggregate and individual responses are in line with theoretical predictions,and thus with strategic voting. Finally, subjects' behavior under AV highlights the need to study equilibria inasymmetric strategies.

Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
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Published in: Journal of public economics (2016) v.134 n° 2,p.114-128

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Related works:
Journal Article: Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment (2016)
Working Paper: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment (2015)
Working Paper: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment (2012)
Working Paper: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment (2012)
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