Frames, incentives, and education: Effectiveness of interventions to delay public pension claiming

Franca Glenzer, Pierre-Carl Michaud and Stefan Staubli

Journal of Public Economics, 2025, vol. 248, issue C

Abstract: In many retirement income systems, people forgo a higher stream of public pension income by claiming early. This paper provides survey- and quasi-experimental evidence on how increasing financial incentives, educating individuals, and changing the framing of the claiming decision affect pension claiming and the present value of expected pension benefits. We find that all three types of interventions induce delays, but they have heterogeneous financial consequences. Educating participants about the claiming decision and life expectancy leads to claiming ages with higher pension wealth. In contrast, changing the framing of the claiming decision and strengthening financial incentives do not improve, and may even worsen, financial outcomes.

Keywords: Pension claiming; Annuities; Retirement; Financial education; Framing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 H55 J14 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272725001173
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:248:y:2025:i:c:s0047272725001173

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105419

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba

More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().