Frames, Incentives, and Education: Effectiveness of Interventions to Delay Public Pension Claiming

Franca Glenzer, Pierre-Carl Michaud and Stefan Staubli

Cahiers de recherche / Working Papers from Institut sur la retraite et l'épargne / Retirement and Savings Institute

Abstract: Many near-retirees forgo a higher stream of public pension income by claiming early. We provide both quasi-experimental and survey-experimental evidence that the timing of public pension claiming is relatively inelastic to changes in financial incentives in Canada. Using the survey experiment, we evaluate the effect of two different educational interventions and different ways of framing the incentive to delay claiming. While all three types of interventions induce delays, these interventions have heterogeneous financial consequences for participants who react.

Keywords: pension claiming; annuities; retirement; financial education; framing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 H55 J14 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-fle, nep-lma and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Frames, Incentives, and Education: Effectiveness of Interventions to Delay Public Pension Claiming (2023)
Working Paper: Frames, Incentives, and Education: Effectiveness of Interventions to Delay Public Pension Claiming (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rsi:irersi:11

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