Frames, Incentives, and Education: Effectiveness of Interventions to Delay Public Pension Claiming

Franca Glenzer, Pierre-Carl Michaud and Stefan Staubli

No 30938, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In many retirement income systems, people forgo a higher stream of public pension income by claiming early. We provide both survey-experimental and quasi-experimental evidence that the timing of public pension claiming is relatively inelastic to changes in financial incentives. Using the survey experiment, we evaluate the effect of two different educational interventions and different ways of framing the decision on the present value of participants' expected pension payments. While all three types of interventions induce delays, these interventions have heterogeneous financial consequences. Educating participants leads to claiming ages with higher pension wealth. In contrast, framing and financial incentives do not improve, and even worsen, financial outcomes. Understanding the impact of various policy tools on expected pension wealth is essential for designing policies to delay claiming.

JEL-codes: G53 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-exp and nep-lma
Note: AG
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Frames, Incentives, and Education: Effectiveness of Interventions to Delay Public Pension Claiming (2023)
Working Paper: Frames, Incentives, and Education: Effectiveness of Interventions to Delay Public Pension Claiming (2023)
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