Who is afraid of pirates? An experiment on the deterrence of innovation by imitation

Christoph Engel and Marco Kleine

Research Policy, 2015, vol. 44, issue 1, 20-33

Abstract: In the policy debate, intellectual property is often justified by what seems to be a straightforward argument: if innovators are not protected against others appropriating their ideas, incentives for innovation are suboptimally low. Now, in most industries and for most potential users, appropriating a foreign innovation is itself an investment decision fraught with cost and risk. Nonetheless, standard theory predicts too little innovation. Arguably the problem is exacerbated by the sensitivity of innovators to fairness; imitators do get a free lunch, after all.

Keywords: Innovation; Imitation; Appropriation; Patent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D22 D62 D63 H23 H41 K11 L17 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Who is Afraid of Pirates? An Experiment on the Deterrence of Innovation by Imitation (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:respol:v:44:y:2015:i:1:p:20-33

DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2014.07.020

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