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Board structures and performance in the banking industry: Evidence from Japan

Hideaki Sakawa () and Naoki Watanabel

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2018, vol. 56, issue C, 308-320

Abstract: This paper presents an examination of the relation between board size and composition and firm performance for the Japanese banking industry during 2006–2011. Our results for the banking industry show that the advisory and monitoring roles of larger boards and outside directors are ineffective. Results also show that banks which received taxpayer funds cannot reform their board structure and that taxpayer funds do not strengthen the advisory role of outside directors. We conclude that Japanese bank boards have not performed well during recent periods and that taxpayer funds have tended to rescue banks with weaker governance.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Banking and finance; Board of directors; Japan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G34 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.11.001

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