Partial acquisition with an excluded public rival
John Heywood () and
International Review of Economics & Finance, 2019, vol. 59, issue C, 164-173
This paper examines partial acquisition in the face of an outside public firm. We show that when the acquiring firm is domestic, partial acquisition takes place for any institutional threshold for pricing control. Yet, when the acquiring firm is foreign, partial acquisition can be forestalled by a sufficiently high threshold requirement. This threshold can increase domestic welfare and global welfare by stopping an inefficient partial acquisition. Moreover, this mixed market structure can generate greater global welfare than one with an outside private firm.
Keywords: Partial acquisition; Public firm; Salop circular market; Control threshold (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L22 L32 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:59:y:2019:i:c:p:164-173
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