Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: Testing for order effects
Michalis Drouvelis () and
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2016, vol. 62, issue C, 1-7
We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment. We discuss how these results compare with those reported in the existing literature.
Keywords: Social norms; Norm elicitation; Order effects; Within-subject design; Bribery game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Norm Elicitation in Within-Subject Designs: Testing for Order Effects (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:62:y:2016:i:c:p:1-7
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