Norm Elicitation in Within-Subject Designs: Testing for Order Effects

Giovanna d'Adda, Michalis Drouvelis and Daniele Nosenzo

No 2015-02, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment.

Keywords: social norms; norm elicitation; order effects; within-subject design; corruption; bribe game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: Testing for order effects (2016)
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