Network investment, access and competition

Roman Inderst and Martin Peitz

Telecommunications Policy, 2012, vol. 36, issue 5, 407-418

Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of different contract types and access regulation on innovation and competition in telecommunications in the context of Next Generation Access Networks. Within a standard duopoly model, it is shown that ex-post access contracts lead less often to the duplication of investment, but to a wider roll-out compared to a market in which such contracts cannot be offered. In comparison to such ex-post contracts, ex-ante contracts lead to an even wider roll-out, but to a less frequent duplication of investments. Ex-ante contracts in particular, but also ex-post contracts, can be used to dampen competition.

Keywords: Telecommunication; NGN; Access surcharge; Investment; Innovation; Contracts between network operators (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Working Paper: Network Investment, Access and Competition (2012)
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DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2011.12.007

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