Network Investment, Access and Competition

Roman Inderst and Martin Peitz

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We analyze the role of different contract types and access regulation on innovation and competition in telecommunications in the context of Next Generation Access Networks. Within a standard duopoly model, we show that ex-post access contracts lead less often to the duplication of investment, but to a wider roll-out compared to a market in which such contracts cannot be offered. In comparison to such ex-post contracts, ex-ante contracts lead to an even wider roll-out, but to a less frequent duplication of investments. Ex-ante contracts in particular, but also ex-post contracts, can be used to dampen competition.

Keywords: Telecommunication; NGN, Access surcharge; Investment, Innovation; Contracts between network operators (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

Published in Telecommunications Policy 5.36(2012): pp. 407-418

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Journal Article: Network investment, access and competition (2012)
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