Optimizing intersections

Ruth Evers and Stef Proost

Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 2015, vol. 71, issue C, 100-119

Abstract: In this paper we optimize the regulation of an intersection of two routes connecting one origin–destination pair and study the effects of priority rules, traffic lights and tolls. We show that when the intersection is regulated by a priority rule the optimal policy is generally to block one of the two routes. When the intersection is regulated by traffic lights, it can only be optimal to leave both routes open when both routes are subject to congestion or if a toll is levied.

Keywords: Stackelberg game; Road pricing; Signal setting; Priority rule; Braess paradox (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Optimizing intersections (2013)
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DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2014.10.006

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