Monetary policy and the independence dilemma

John Williams

FRBSF Economic Letter, 2015

Abstract: The dilemma of central bank independence has been around a long time. Past attempts to solve it through an operational mandate such as the gold standard have proven ineffective. The alternative approach of achieving economic goals through reliance on a fixed policy rule also poses practical challenges. A more promising path is to enhance accountability and transparency within an existing goal mandate framework. The following is adapted from a presentation by the president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco to Chapman University in Orange, California, on May 1.

Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.frbsf.org/wp-content/uploads/el2015-15.pdf Full Text (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Monetary policy and the independence dilemma (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedfel:00055

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in FRBSF Economic Letter from Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Research Library ().