Decisions on Extending Group Membership—Evidence from a Public Good Experiment
Christian Grund,
Christine Harbring,
Kirsten Thommes and
Katja Rebecca Tilkes
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Christine Harbring: Chair of Organization, RWTH Aachen University, Templergraben 64, 52062 Aachen, Germany
Kirsten Thommes: Chair of Business Administration esp. Organizational Behavior, Facility of Business, University of Paderborn, Warburger Str. 100, 33098 Paderborn, Germany
Katja Rebecca Tilkes: Chair of HRM and Personnel Economics, RWTH Aachen University, Templergraben 64, 52062 Aachen, Germany
Games, 2020, vol. 11, issue 4, 1-27
Abstract:
We experimentally compare the consequences for group cooperation of two decision mechanisms involving the extension of group membership. We analyze an exogenous decision (random draw) and an endogenous decision (made by a particular group member) mechanism to extend a temporary agent’s group membership. Our results reveal that the prospect of group membership extension affects not only the temporary but also the permanent group members’ contributions with an endogenous mechanism.
Keywords: cooperation; public good game; group membership; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Decisions on Extending Group Membership: Evidence from a Public Good Experiment (2019) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:11:y:2020:i:4:p:61-:d:459720
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