Decisions on Extending Group Membership: Evidence from a Public Good Experiment
Christine Harbring (),
Kirsten Thommes () and
Katja Rebecca Tilkes
Additional contact information
Christine Harbring: RWTH Aachen University
Kirsten Thommes: University of Paderborn
Katja Rebecca Tilkes: RWTH Aachen University
No 12513, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
We experimentally analyze whether the opportunity to receive a permanent contract motivates temporary group members in a public good setting and how this affects the other group members. We compare an exogenous and an endogenous decision mechanism to extend the temporary agent's group membership. The exogenous mechanism to extend the contract is modeled by a random draw. In the endogenous setting, one other group member decides about the temporary agent's future group membership. Our results reveal that both — the decision to extend a contract and the decision mechanism itself — affect not only the temporary group member's effort but also the efforts of the permanent group members and, ultimately, also cooperation within the group after the decision has been made.
Keywords: cooperation; experiments; groups; public good games; teams; temporary employment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12513
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().