From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach

José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez (), António Osório and Josep E. Peris

Games, 2015, vol. 6, issue 1, 1-7

Abstract: Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution.

Keywords: bargaining problem; conflicting claims problem; proportionality; bargaining solutions; claims rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach (2013)
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