From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach

José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez (), Antonio Osorio () and Josep E. Peris
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Antonio Osorio: Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Postal: Departament d'Economia and CREIP,, Av.Universitat 1, 43204 Reus,, Spain.

No 13-2, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: Is it important to negotiate on proportions rather than on numbers? To answer this question, we analyze the behavior of well-known bargaining solutions and the claims rules they induce when they are applied to a "proportionally transformed" bargaining set SP so-called bargaining-in-proportions set. The idea of applying bargaining solutions to claims problems was already developed in Dagan and Volij (1993). They apply the bargaining solutions over a bargaining set that is the one de ned by the claims and the endowment. A comparison among our results and theirs is provided.

Keywords: Bargaining problem; Claims problem; Proportional Constrained Equal Awards; Constrained Equal Losses; Nash bargaining solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2013-05-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach (2015)
Working Paper: From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2013_002

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