From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez (),
António Osório and
Josep E. Peris
Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Is it important to negotiate on proportions rather than on numbers? To answer this question, we analyze the behavior of well-known bargaining solutions and the claims rules they induce when they are applied to a "proportionally transformed" bargaining set SP -so-called bargaining-in-proportions set. The idea of applying bargaining solutions to claims problems was already developed in Dagan and Volij (1993). They apply the bargaining solutions over a bargaining set that is the one de ned by the claims and the endowment. A comparison among our results and theirs is provided. Keywords: Bargaining problem, Claims problem, Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Nash bargaining solution. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.
Keywords: Jocs cooperatius; Igualtat; Decisió; Presa de; 33 - Economia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://hdl.handle.net/2072/212193
Related works:
Journal Article: From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach (2015) 
Working Paper: From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/212193
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