Signaling Virtue: Charitable Behavior Under Consumer Elective Pricing

Minah H. Jung (), Leif D. Nelson (), Uri Gneezy and Ayelet Gneezy ()
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Minah H. Jung: Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, New York 10012
Leif D. Nelson: Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720
Ayelet Gneezy: Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093

Marketing Science, 2017, vol. 36, issue 2, 187-194

Abstract: Two field experiments examined generosity under consumer elective pricing. In shared social responsibility (SSR), consumers choose how much to pay, knowing that a percentage of their payment goes to support a charitable cause. Replicating past research, consumers in our experiments were sensitive to the presence of charitable giving, paying more when a portion of their payment went to charity. Notably, however, they were largely insensitive to the percentage of payment allocated to charity—customers paid little more when 99% of the payment went to charity than when only 1% went to charity. Neither self-selection nor social pressure fully explained higher payments under SSR.

Keywords: charitable giving; consumer elective pricing; pay what you want; scope insensitivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:36:y:2017:i:2:p:187-194

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