Incentives Between Firms (and Within)

Robert Gibbons

Management Science, 2005, vol. 51, issue 1, 2-17

Abstract: This paper reviews the significant progress in Üagency theoryÝ (i.e., the economic theory of incentives) during the 1990s, with an eye toward applications to supply transactions. I emphasize six recent models, in three pairs: (1) new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts, (2) new directions in incentive theory, and (3) new applications to supply transactions. By reviewing these six models, I hope to establish three things. First, the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations. Second, new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives. Finally (and especially relevant to supply transactions), the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem.

Keywords: incentives; agency theory; relational contracts; supply transactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (95)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0229 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:51:y:2005:i:1:p:2-17

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().