Research Note---Price Discrimination After the Purchase: Rebates as State-Dependent Discounts

Yuxin Chen, Sridhar Moorthy () and Z. John Zhang ()
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Sridhar Moorthy: Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6, Canada
Z. John Zhang: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

Management Science, 2005, vol. 51, issue 7, 1131-1140

Abstract: Promotional tools such as rebates and coupons are usually seen as different ways of price discriminating among consumers. We focus on a different property of rebates: their ability to price discriminate within a consumer among her postpurchase states. Unlike price discrimination between consumers, this property is unique to rebates because, by design, they are redeemed after the purchase. (Coupons, by contrast, are redeemed with the purchase.) The consumer redeems the rebate only in postpurchase states in which her marginal utility of income is high. This selective redemption behavior provides an opportunity for the seller to "utility arbitrage," directing discounts to when they matter most, resulting in an increase in the consumer's up-front willingness to pay. In turn, this enables an increase in the regular price. Of course, rebates can still price discriminate among consumers. Indeed, their ability to deliver state-dependent discounts may enhance their overall price discrimination ability, as we show in an example comparing them to coupons.

Keywords: rebates; state-dependent discounts; utility arbitrage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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