Paying to Be Nice: Consistency and Costly Prosocial Behavior

Ayelet Gneezy (), Alex Imas, Amber Brown (), Leif D. Nelson () and Michael I. Norton ()
Additional contact information
Ayelet Gneezy: Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093
Amber Brown: Disney Research Boston, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142
Leif D. Nelson: Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720
Michael I. Norton: Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts 02163

Management Science, 2012, vol. 58, issue 1, 179-187

Abstract: Building on previous research in economics and psychology, we propose that the costliness of initial prosocial behavior positively influences whether that behavior leads to consistent future behaviors. We suggest that costly prosocial behaviors serve as a signal of prosocial identity and that people subsequently behave in line with that self-perception. In contrast, costless prosocial acts do not signal much about one's prosocial identity, so subsequent behavior is less likely to be consistent and may even show the reductions in prosocial behavior associated with licensing. The results of a laboratory experiment and a large field experiment converge to support our account. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, Teck Ho, and Terrance Odean, special issue editors.

Keywords: charitable giving; moral consistency; licensing; field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (87)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:58:y:2012:i:1:p:179-187

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