Observability Increases the Demand for Commitment Devices

Christine L. Exley () and Jeffrey Naecker
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Christine L. Exley: Negotiation, Organizations and Markets Unit, Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts 02163

Management Science, 2017, vol. 63, issue 10, 3262-3267

Abstract: Previous research often interprets the choice to restrict one’s future opportunity set as evidence for sophisticated time inconsistency. We propose an additional mechanism that may contribute to the demand for commitment technology: the desire to signal to others. We present a field experiment where participants can choose to give up money if they do not follow through with an action. When commitment choices are made public rather than kept private, we find significantly higher uptake rates.

Keywords: field experiment; commitment; signaling; time inconsistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Observability Increases the Demand for Commitment Devices (2016)
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