Consistency as a Signal of Skills

Armin Falk and Florian Zimmermann

Management Science, 2017, vol. 63, issue 7, 2197-2210

Abstract: This paper studies the role of consistency as a signaling device. We propose a two-period model that highlights the informativeness of consistency as a signal of skills and allows for the analysis of consequences for behavior. In a simple principal–agent experiment, we test the basic intuition of the model. We show that consistency is indeed associated with skills. Consequently, consistency is valued by others, inducing people to act consistently.

Keywords: consistency; signaling; image concerns; experiments; leadership; principal–agent relationships (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:63:y:2017:i:7:p:2197-2210

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